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Abstract
We consider how globalization has affected demographic trends and how demographic
trends have affected globalization. We focus on developments over the last  years and
emphasize “economic globalization”the integration of product, capital, and labor markets
and the rapid diffusion of technology and information across borders. We begin by
relating a brief history of economic globalization since  and then identify demographic
trends that may have significant effects on economic globalization. We consider how
globalization has affected demographic trends and then discuss how demographic trends
have affected globalization. We conclude by reflecting on how our analysis is affected by
the increased pace of globalization over the last  years.
Keywords: globalization, population, trade, saving, international capital flows, investment,
development
Globalization is not new, and neither is its interaction with demographic trends.
Alexander the Great’s conquest of the Middle East instilled Greek culture in a vast
population ranging from North Africa to India; and Roman, Chinese, and Mayan empires
brought dominant languages and new immigrants to conquered regions. The movement
of goods along the thousands of miles of the Silk Road trade route raised wages and
wealth in both China and Europe in the Middle Ages without inducing major flows of
population from one region to another; at the same time it facilitated the transmission of
the Black Plague from Mongolia to Europe. The global diffusion of vaccines preventing
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polio, smallpox, and measles reduced death rates dramatically in developed countries
after  and in developing countries after . In contrast with continued increases in
life expectancy in Asia, the Americas, and Western Europe, life expectancy has collapsed
in sub-Saharan Africa, Russia, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe since . The globali-
zation of war over the last  years has entailed the temporary migration of millions of
soldiers and the often more permanent migration of millions of refugees. Changing
population age structures induced global flows of capital in both the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, while international immigration was a critical cause of relative and
absolute factor price convergence across Europe and the Americas. And the large
increase in world population over the last 	 years may be at least in part responsible for
the recent surge in inventions that have markedly reduced computing and communica-
tion costs and, consequently, set off the most recent surge in globalization.
Our goal in this article is to consider how globalization has affected demographic
trends and how demographic trends have affected globalization. Our survey of these
issues is far from comprehensive, as we focus on developments over the last  years and
emphasize economic aspects of globalization. The economic perspective is an important
distinguishing feature of this article, entailing a narrow view of globalization that
focuses on the integration of product, capital, and labor markets and the rapid diffusion
of technology and information across borders. Demographers have spent considerable
effort analyzing how global forces have affected demographic trendsthat is, how the
rapid international diffusion of birth control technology has reduced birth rates, how the
international diffusion of public health measures has reduced death rates, and how
changing relative wages have affected female labor force participation and marriage
rates. Less attention has been paid to how demographic trends have affected globaliza-
tion. Does a growing population necessarily lead to more integrated labor or product
markets or to increased international diffusion of technologies? Does an aging popula-
tion necessarily lead to increased international capital flows, or instead to increased
xenophobia and increasingly closed markets?
We begin in Section I by considering why narratives of globalization differ so
markedly depending on the perspectives of those telling the story. Section II relates a
brief history of economic globalization since . Section III focuses on identifying
demographic trends that may have significant effects on economic globalization. Section
IV considers how globalization has affected demographic trends, whereas Section V
considers how demographic trends have affected globalization. We conclude, in Section
VI, by reflecting on how our analysis is affected by the increased pace of globalization
over the last  years.
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I Globalization and Population: Perspectives and Prelude
Stories of globalization are widely contested. Some analysts view globalization as a
process by which the powerful exploit the weak in increasingly remote areas of the globe;
others view it as a process by which all countries increase their wealth. Both views have
an element of truth and depend on the perspective of the analyst. Advantages in
armaments and opponents’ susceptibility to disease allowed a few European countries
and their offshoots to colonize societies throughout Africa, the Americas, Europe, Asia,
Australasia, and the Pacific between  and .) In contrast, others emphasize how
international flows of capital, labor, intermediate goods, and final goods in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries led to absolute factor price convergence across rich and poor
countries whereas restrictions on those flows led to divergence. Similar contrasts can be
drawn on numerous issuesfor example, the spread of disease by global conquest, trade,
and tourism versus the spread of vaccines by international agencies; and the develop-
ment of virtual communities of dispersed ethnic groups versus the reduction in cultural
variety induced by mass consumption of a hegemonic culture. Much of the debate can be
traced back to whether the analyst believes in the enlightenment concept of progress or
instead believes that unintended consequences of new production and organization
technologies often have pernicious indirect effects that outweigh the direct gains accru-
ing to societies with high levels of market integration, information flows, and technolog-
ical innovation.
The contested-stories analogy carries over to the field of population. Debate has
raged over the effects of a growing global population on the environment, resources,
income, innovation, and social relations. Some demographers and economists have
focused on how increasing global population could exhaust resources, alter the climate in
life-threatening ways, and increase congestion costs to unacceptable levels. Others have
focused on how larger global populations could generate new waves of innovation with
the potential to offset most of the costs described above. Some analysts draw from both
of the above perspectives while emphasizing that individual decisions concerning mar-
riage, labor force participation, children, medical care, and education are made on the
basis of private costs and benefits that frequently diverge from social costs and benefits
and, therefore, result in outcomes that are often inefficient.
  Our dating of “world wars” should be revised. A redating would show five world wars over
the last  years rather than two. In this scheme the first world war was the war between
Britain and France, known in the United States as the French-Indian War, which was
fought over five continents between  and . The second world war consisted of the
several Napoleonic Wars (	) that were fought over five continents and generated
South America’s independence revolutions. World Wars I and II (now III and IV) were, of




The interaction between population and globalization clearly goes back to prehistor-
ical periods when early human beings slowly migrated from Africa to distant land areas
across the globe. One can, however, date an acceleration of the interaction at . The
arrival of European explorers in the Americas and their conquest of the Inca and Mayan
empires set off an unprecedented wave of depopulation among Native Americans due to
the spread of smallpox, measles, mumps, and other diseases to which Native Americans
had little immunity.) Disease and the enslavement of conquered populations by the
Portuguese and Spanish reduced the Native American population by roughly  percent
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Similar demographic catastrophes
would be repeated with Aborigines in Australia and Pacific Islanders in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries after contact with Europeans.) The depopulation of the
Americas and Australia was one of the factors that led to the enslavement and forced
migration of  million Africans from the s through  and voluntary immigra-
tion of  million people between  and  from land-poor, labor-abundant Europe.)
European susceptibility to tropical diseases limited settler immigration to Africa to the
Northern and Southern extremes, but colonization of tropical Africa was eventually
completed in the late nineteenth century [Curtin ]. World population growth,
proceeding at low but positive levels since roughly 	, received a jolt with the
agricultural revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The improved
nutrition, reduced mortality rates, and increasing population growth rates in Western
Europe set the stage for the beginning of the demographic transitions (see Section III
below), the signal demographic phenomena of the last  years.
II Economic Globalization since 
Although globalization trends have had enormous effects on demographic trends since
, we focus on globalization since  because its ebbs and flows over the last 
years provide key insights into our current situation. We subdivide the  period
into three periods based on divergent trends in economic globalization: Globalization in
a Colonial World (), Retreat from Globalization (), and Globalization in a
Postcolonial World (present).
  See Bentley and Ziegler [] for an overview of the conquest of the Americas and popula-
tion decline there.
  See Butlin [] for a discussion of Aboriginal population decline and Bushnell [] for a
review of the controversy over the extent of the decline in Hawaiian population after
European contact.
  See Baines [] for an overview of nineteenth-century European migration to the Ameri-
cas and Hatton and Williamson [] for a more in-depth analysis of the causes of immigra-
tion and the effects on sending and receiving economies. See Fogel [] for a comprehen-
sive discussion of the introduction of slavery to the Americas.
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Extent of Globalization in 1850
At the beginning of the first period (), market integration across Europe and across
the globe was limited, and information and technology diffused slowly. Tariffs were high
in most industrialized countries, and the effect was to limit international trade flows.
Capital markets were growing in importance, yet were still undeveloped, trading few
financial instruments and with listings for only the largest railroads, banks, trading
companies, and utilities. Their limited development meant that capital flows across
national borders constituted a large portion of investment for only a small number of
countries. Foreign direct investment was extremely limited. Immigration from Europe
to the Americas and Australasia had been slowly increasing, but the flows were still small
proportions of the growing European populations. There are many well-known cases of
rapid technology diffusion across national boundaries during this periodfor example,
Samuel Slater’s transfer of cotton-spinning technology from England to Rhode Island in
but, as a rule, technology diffused with long and variable delays. In sum, both
dimensions of economic globalization, international market integration and information
and technology diffusion, were extremely limited.
Globalization in a Colonial World: 18501914
During this first period (), economic globalization proceeded at a rapid pace,
leading to an unprecedented degree of capital, labor, and product market integration by
the end of the century. The most important force behind the globalization push in this
period was the reduction in land- and sea-transport costs, with the largest absolute
reductions coming in land transport and the largest percentage reductions in sea trans-
port [O’Rourke and Williamson : Ch.  ]. The opening of the Suez and Panama canals
during this period also helped to reduce transcontinental price gaps. The lower transpor-
tation costs led to a surge in international trade, which in turn produced a convergence
in the Anglo-American prices of important products such as wheat (from a 	
 percent
gap in Chicago-Liverpool prices in  to a 	
 percent gap by ), meat (from more
than a  percent gap in Cincinnati-London prices in  to a 	 percent gap by ),
iron bars (from a  percent gap in London-Philadelphia prices in  to a 	
 percent
gap by ), copper (from a 	 percent gap in London-Philadelphia prices in  to
roughly no gap by ), coal, tin, wool, and coffee [Harley ]. Declining transportation
costs massively reduced price gaps between Europe and Asia on cotton, jute, and rice
(from a  percent price gap between London and Rangoon in  to a 
 percent gap in
) [O’Rourke and Williamson : Ch.  ; see also Williamson ]. Great Britain’s

 repeal of its Corn Laws, which had imposed tariffs on grain imports, and the 

Cobden-Chevalier treaty between Great Britain and France, reducing tariffs substantially
and providing for most-favored-nation treatment, led the way to a series of treaties
liberalizing trade in Europe.
With tariffs and transport costs declining and the gold standard reducing exchange-
  
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rate uncertainty, the share of trade in gross domestic product (GDP) increased in every
region except Latin America, where it declined slightly (Table  ). Trade shares doubled
in Asia, more than tripled in Africa, went up by  percent in Western settler economies,
and increased by  percent in Western Europe [Maddison : ].
Falling transportation costs, lower prices of agricultural goods in Europe, and
surging wages in the United States prompted a massive flow of immigrants from Europe
to North America, South America, and Australia; from India to Africa and Asia; from
China to Southeast Asia and the United States; and from Japan to North America, South
America, and Hawaii in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Transport
costs between Southern Europe and South America fell to such low levels that they
supported seasonal flows of workers between the two regions.) Immigration to the
United States increased from 	 per 
 population in  to  per 
 in 	,
reaching record levels between  and 	. The growing integration of world capital
and product markets was a major factor behind the increased immigration flows. Lower
transportation costs and lower European tariff rates on agricultural products induced a
flood of U. S. agricultural exports to Europe in the later decades of the nineteenth
century. The declining prices of agricultural products and other imported products hurt
European farmers and industrial workers in import-competing industries, and some
decided to emigrate to the Americas and Australasia.
The spread of the gold standard over the second half of the nineteenth century; the
development of broader and deeper equity markets in the United States, Canada, and
Europe; the higher saving rates in France, England, and Germanypossibly generated by
the demographic transition in these countries; and an increasing propensity to invest
overseas in Germany and Great Britain led to large flows of capital from Western Europe
to Eastern Europe, South America, and North America between  and 	. Large
balance-of-payments deficits by the resource-rich, labor-poor, capital-poor countries of
the Americas were common during this period and facilitated immigration from Europe
  See Hatton and Williamson [		] for a discussion of Southern Europe+Argentina seasonal
immigration and La Croix and Fishback [] for a discussion of temporary migration
from Japan to Hawaii.
Table  Merchandise Exports as a Percentage of GDP in 		 Prices
Region  	 	 	 		
Western Europe
Western European Offshoots








































Source: Maddison : 
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to the Americas by ensuring that new immigrants would be equipped with new capital.)
Retreat from Globalization: 191445
A backlash against economic globalization began to emerge near the end of the first
period [Williamson ]. The United States restricted immigration from Asia with the
Chinese Exclusion Act () and the Gentlemen’s Agreement with Japan (). In
reaction to the flood of American agricultural products entering Europe in the s,
Germany, Sweden, France, and many other European countries began to re-impose tariffs
on grain imports and raw materials in the late s and early s. Only Great Britain,
Denmark, the Netherlands, and some countries (e. g., Japan) and colonies with gunboat-
imposed trade policies retained relatively liberal trade policies.
The beginning of the second period was marked by a shattering global war,
World War I, which brought economic globalization to a halt and set in motion
forces that would ultimately reverse virtually all of the labor, capital, and product
market integration achieved in the earlier Globalization Period. Newly created states
in Europe produced refugee flows and fragile, short-lived democracies [Mazower ].
Most industrialized countries left the gold standard during World War I and did not
resume the standard again until the s [Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo ]. With
the notable exception of Great Britain, most countries did not resume the gold
standard at the previous parity, thereby impairing investor confidence that foreign
investments were not subject to severe exchange-rate risk.) Britain’s large wartime
borrowings converted it from a net creditor to a net debtor and diminished its role
as the main international financier. The United States, now a net creditor nation, was
unable to replace the British flows because it did not have the requisite institutional
infrastructure or depth of knowledge to undertake large-scale international lending.
International capital flows to South America and Asia resumed at much lower levels after
World War I ( percent rather than 	
 percent), declined during the s, and
descended to very low levels in the s (
 percent), as international financial
and domestic banking crises slowly unraveled the gold standard during the Great
  O’Rourke and Williamson [: ] find that a large proportion of the catch-up and
falling-behind of countries in Europe and the European periphery during the 	
period was due to labor migration and capital flows. Trade played a surprisingly small role
in their convergence with or divergence from the GDP leaders.
  See Eichengreen []. Most countries involved in World War I financed part of their
wartime expenditures and postwar expenditures with inflationary finance. To resume the
gold standard at “parity”the same exchange rate between the currency and gold when
they left the gold standard, a country would have to be subjected to a difficult period of
deflation. Given the expanded franchise and the weak condition of political parties in new




Immigration from Europe to the United States was almost totally curtailed during
World War I and World War II and was severely restricted in the interwar period by
national legislation ( and ) that restricted annual immigration to just 	
people from outside the Americas and mandated that  percent of immigrants be from
Great Britain and 

 percent from Germany.) The redrawing of European borders at the
 Paris Conference stimulated large migration flows in Central and Eastern Europe.
European countries responded by imposing immigration restrictions in the s and

s, with only France remaining open to Eastern European migrants.
Higher tariffs were imposed throughout the industrialized world in the s and

s, with the U. S. passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariff in 
 provoking retaliatory
responses in France, Great Britain, Germany, and most other industrialized countries.
France, England, the United States, and Germany responded to the disintegration of the
world financial and trading systems by forming regional trading blocs with colonial and
regional partners during the 
s. Although economics historians have debated
whether the collapse of world trade during the 
s was due to higher tariffs or the
collapse of the world monetary system, the segmentation of national capital, labor, and
product markets is widely accepted. The drastic decline in the share of trade in GDP
during this period provides graphic evidence (Table  ). Increasing transportation costs
also played a significant role in reducing the share of trade in GDP during the s and

s [Estevadeoral, Frantz and Taylor ].
Other trends affecting economic globalization during this period of retreat were
more positive. The expansion of the telephone network, the rapid adoption of the radio,
the spread of the newsreel in theaters, and the expansion of higher-education institutions
facilitated a more rapid dissemination of technologies and information. Expenditures on
research and development declined during the Great Depression of the 
s in Europe
and the United States, but a large flow of new public health, medical, and nutritional
technologies was still generated.
World War II provides a fourth example of global war. Capital was destroyed
throughout the world; weapons of mass destruction were used on civilian populations in
Asia and Europe; regional transportation networks and mobile extermination facilities
reduced Hitler’s costs of decimating Europe’s Jewish population; and roughly 
million people lost their lives through wartime combat, genocide, or famine. Two world
wars in combination with the interwar depression left national factor and product
markets operating virtually in isolation at the end of World War II. The international
monetary system was in shambles; tariffs were high in virtually every countryÜa
  See Eichengreen [] for a full discussion of these issues. See Obstfeld and Taylor []
for data on capital flows between  and .
  The  legislation reduced the annual flow to 	 people. By comparison, annual
immigration to the United States in  had been 		 people.
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hangover from the s; and voluntary immigration was severely restricted, while
post-war refugee flows numbered in the tens of millions in Japan, China, Korea, Europe,
India, and Pakistan.
Globalization in a Post-Colonial World: 1945Present
The flawed revival of the gold standard after World War I severely limited international
capital flows, and after World War II countries acted to replace the gold standard with
the Bretton Woods Agreement. Retaining fixed exchange rates and the veneer of a tie
with gold, the new financial system allowed countries to implement exchange-rate
controls that limited international capital flows. The dollar was linked to gold whereas
other currencies were linked to the dollar. Most European currencies became convertible
on the current account (but not on the capital account) only in , and binding capital
controls remained in place in the United States, Europe, Japan, and most of the develop-
ing world through the mid-s. As a result, capital flows stagnated at only  percent
of GDP for  of the world’s industrialized countries over the  period [Obstfeld and
Taylor ]. With the United States leading the way in the 	s, Japan and the
European countries began to remove capital controls in the s, with the trend
accelerating in the s. Developing countries, under pressure from the International
Monetary Fund, began the process of removing capital controls in the s and s.)
The gradual restoration of integrated product markets in manufactured goods was
accomplished over a -year period by gradual tariff reductions under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)now the World Trade Organization (WTO)
as well as by unilateral tariff reductions. Limited progress in trade in services has been
made over the last  years, and the  Uruguay Round Agreement specified a
back-loaded dismantling of the Multifibre Agreement, an elaborate maze of quotas on
textiles manufactured in low- and middle-income countries. Trade in agricultural prod-
ucts is still heavily protected by most industrialized countries, with elaborate systems of
tariffs and quotas in place and complex political obstacles blocking future reform. The
asymmetric liberalization of trade in manufactures relative to agriculture and textiles
has hurt income growth in developing countries specializing in such labor- and land-
intensive products. Despite the asymmetric liberalization, Sachs and Warner [] find
that countries that liberalized trade in the postWorld War II period experienced higher
than average GDP growth. Incomes in poor countries with liberal trade policies generally
converged with those in rich countries. This contrasts with results from the overall
sample of countries in which incomes of poor and rich countries diverged over the course
of the three globalization periods [Pritchett ].)
 Some economists blame the removal of capital controls in Asian countries for the Asian
financial crisis in the late s. See, e. g., Bhagwati [
].
 Poor countries with poor data are excluded from such cross-country studies, often biasing
the results. See Frankel and Romer [] for additional supporting arguments and
Rodríguez and Rodrik [
] for contrary views.
  	
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Immigration, a major contributor to GDP convergence in the  period, has
increased gradually in the postWorld War II period and has served as an attenuating
force on the demographic transition. Immigration can, for example, dampen population
growth or the swings in age structure that occur during the transition. Sending
populations are often those that are growing rapidly with heavy concentrations at young
ages. Receiving countries are often those that are experiencing slower population
growth and aging populations. Immigrants are frequently young workers who have
children or begin families once they have relocated. The high rate of immigration into
the United States over the last three decades is one of the key reasons why the U. S. age
structure is expected to stay much younger than Japan’s.
Between  and , immigration to the United States was very limited and
restricted to European countries. Legislative reforms in  opened the door to larger
immigrant flows from a broader mix of countries.) U. S. immigration flows are currently
about the same as in the early twentieth century, but have a smaller impact on the U. S.
economy and on sending economies because the U. S. population has almost tripled,
growing from  million in  to 	 million in , and world population has more
than tripled, increasing from 
	 billion in  to 
 billion in . Some countries
sending migrants to the larger U. S. economy have experienced significant reductions in
their workforces in recent years.
Migration flows have also had large implications for other sending and receiving
countries. Ethnic German populations migrated to West Germany after World War II and
after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Repatriation of colonial populations after World War II,
and refugees from civil wars generated large refugee flows in central Africa, Venezuela
(from Colombia), Pakistan and Iran (from Afghanistan), Taiwan (from China), Korea (from
North to South), and Vietnam. Temporary and permanent immigration within Europe
and to Europefrom Africa, Asia, and Turkeyafter World War II markedly increased
the share of migrants in the labor forces of Switzerland ( percent), Luxembourg (
percent), Belgium (  percent), Germany (  percent), and Austria (  percent); whereas
inter-Asian migration has led to large shares of migrant workers in the labor forces of
Hong Kong (  percent), Malaysia ( percent), and Singapore ( percent). Since the mid-
s, Europe has tightened regulations with respect to refugees, making it more difficult
for them to enter and settle. Many of the small oil economies of the Middle East,
including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, have large percentages of migrant workers in their
labor forces, many of them from Asian countries. And Israel’s population has swelled as
a result of migration from the Middle East and countries in the former Soviet Union.
Communication and transportation costs have continued to decline since World War
II. The digitization of information and the expanding use of the Internet to distribute
information have led to large declines in the cost of gathering information. The
 Our discussion of immigration relies heavily on Martin and Widgren [].
S. J. L6 CGD>M, A. M6HDC and A7: S. : Population and Globalization
249
introduction and improvement of the jumbo jet and the continued standardization of sea
and rail container shipment have combined to reduce the costs of transporting people
and goods. As in the earlier two periods, continuing improvements in transportation and
communication costs have the potential to diffuse information more rapidly and to
increase life expectancy, via improvements in public health, nutrition, and medical
treatment. The proliferation of nonprofit and intergovernmental organizations dedicated
to improving economic, social, environmental, and demographic conditions in developing
countries has also helped to speed the pace of globalization.
III Demographic Transitions
The demographic transition is a singular historical period during which mortality and
fertility rates decline from high to low levels in a particular country or region. The broad
outlines of the transition are similar in countries around the world, but the pace and
timing of the transition have varied considerably. In this section we describe this
important demographic phenomenon, emphasizing three demographic variables that
bear most directly on globalization: the size of national populations, their rates of growth,
and their age structures. We then discuss the ways in which globalization has influenced
the transition through its affects on fertility, mortality, and immigration.
The transition began earliest in Europe and in former European-settler colonies.
Death rates began to decline in some European populations in the mid- or late-s.
Fertility declined with a substantial lag in some cases and with a very short lag in others.
The transition from high to low fertility took nearly  years in France but roughly 
years in the United States.
The transition began later elsewhere, and the changes were often much more rapid
once they began to occur. Mortality decline in Africa and Asia (Japan aside) was
concentrated in the twentieth century, with substantial advances occurring both before
and after World War II. Life expectancy in India was only  years at the beginning of
the twentieth century, and life expectancy in China was only  years in 
[Maddison : ]. The total fertility rate did not drop below five births per woman in
Japan until the s, and in other Asian countries fertility decline did not begin until the
s or later. As a result, Asia and the rest of the developing world experienced rapid
population growth in the decades after World War II and consequently rapid changes in
their age structure. The United States and many other countries in the West experienced
a postWorld War II baby boom, which produced large swings in age structure that are
in some respects similar to the swings in age structure produced by the demographic
transition in Asia. The baby boom in the West resulted from rising birth rates, whereas




Perhaps the most striking aspect of the demographic transition is the enormous
gap in life expectancy that emerged between Japan and the West on the one hand and the
rest of the world on the other. By  a substantial gap in life expectancy at birth of 
years had already emerged. By  the gap had increased to  years as essentially all
of the gains in life expectancy were confined to Japan and the West. Between  and
 life expectancy improved significantly throughout the world, but the gap in life
expectancy continued to rise, reaching  years in . Only in the second half of the
twentieth century was there any convergence, with the gap declining to  years in
.)
Of course, averages sometimes hide important details. The gains in life expectancy
outside the West would have been much greater had it not been for the devastating
impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa and deteriorating conditions in
Russia and some other Eastern European and Central Asian republics (see Fig.  ).
The differences in the timing of the demographic transition led to significant shifts
in the global distribution of population. During the nineteenth century the populations
of Europe and Western offshoots grew significantly in relation to the rest of the world.
Between  and  their share of the world’s population increased from 	 percent
to 	 percent. The population share of Asia and Oceania dropped from 
	 percent to

	 percent during the same period because its population was growing at only 	
percent per annum (Table  ). India and China both experienced long periods of
economic stagnation and decline during the nineteenth century. India’s decline was
 Maddison [: ] estimates a life expectancy at birth of 
 years in , 
 years in ,


 years in , and  years in  for Japan, Western Europe, and Western offshoots.
For the other countries of the world he estimates a life expectancy of  years in , 

years in ,  years in , and 
 years in .
Fig.  Life Expectancy in Selected Countries: 

Source: World Bank 
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coupled with severe famines toward the end of that century.
During the twentieth century, population growth rates increased to high levels in
Latin America, Asia, Oceania, and Africa, reversing the global shift in population shares.
The share of Europe and its former European-settler countries declined to only 
percent of the global population by the year , less than its share in . Latin
America’s share more than doubled, and Africa’s share almost doubled.
The shift is even more dramatic if we look at the growth in population. Between 
and , 	 percent of the world’s population growth occurred in Europe and Western
offshoots. Between 
 and , however, only  percent occurred in that region.
United Nations projections imply that the center of gravity of the global population
will shift toward Africa during the coming decades. By 
 Africa’s share of the world







































































































































































































































































































Sources: Figures for  and 
 are from United Nations ; figures for 
 are from
Maddison . Regional classifications follow Maddison .





population will increase to almost  percent as compared with only  percent in 
and  percent in . Population growth will by no means be confined to Africa,
however. The combined population of Asia and Oceania is projected to increase by 
billion and that of Latin America by almost 	 billion by 
.
Changes in population size and growth rates provide an incomplete picture of the
demographic transition because there are also important changes in age structure. The
limited data that are available indicate that changes in age structure have been very
different in Japan and the West than in the rest of world (Fig.  ). Beginning in 
 the
dependency ratio varied from about 
 to  in Western European countries (France,
Italy, Spain, Sweden, and England and Wales). The United States had a much higher
dependency ratio in 
, over , due to its much higher birth rate, but by  its
dependency ratio had fallen within the range found among Western European countries.
The overall trend was downward until 
, when the dependency ratio was close to 

for all of these countries. The postWorld War II baby boom, which occurred throughout
the West and was most pronounced in the United States, produced a correspondingly
large, but temporary, increase in the dependency ratio. Currently, the dependency ratio
in the Western countries varies within a relatively narrow band near levels observed in

.
Fig.  Age Structure, Selected Countries, 

Sources: Available from the authors.
Notes: The depecdency ratio is the young population ()the old population (

or , depending on data availability) divided by the working-age
population. Russia () consists of former non-Russian members of the
Soviet Republic. Data for Japan prior to  include honseki.
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Japan’s experience is somewhat distinctive. Its dependency ratio increased fairly
substantially between  and , when the first population census was conducted.)
Between  and the early s its dependency ratio was significantly higher than
ratios found in the West. Japan experienced a precipitous decline in childbearing during
the s, however, and its fertility rates in recent years are among the lowest in the
world. As a consequence, its dependency ratio dropped to a level similar to values found
in Western countries in  and later.
The most noteworthy feature of Fig.  is the distinctive trend found in the develop-
ing countries. The dependency ratios for India and the Philippines were somewhat
higher than in the West around . Taiwan’s dependency ratio was less than 	
 in .
But the precipitous decline in infant and child mortality and the continuation of high
levels of fertility produced an enormous increase in the dependency ratio and the
emergence of a huge gap that reached its peak around .
During the last few decades, the gap in the dependency ratios has begun to disappear
as birth rates have dropped throughout the world. Taiwan and Thailand have already
achieved low dependency ratios, and in countries where fertility has declined more
slowly, the gap between the West and the developing world had become much smaller by
 than it was in .
If we were to trace out the changes in dependency ratios over the next  years, we
would likely find that the positions of the developing world and the West would be
reversed. As populations begin to age, the dependency ratio will rise precipitously. This
will happen first in the West, producing dependency ratios that are substantially higher
than today’s and higher than those found in Latin America or Asia’s developing coun-
tries.
IV The Impact of Globalization on Population
The impact of globalization on population is both direct and indirect. Globalization has
influenced the speed of development, serving as an impetus for faster growth in some
countries and retarding growth in others. Increasing factor, product, and capital-market
integration allowed GDP to increase in Europe and North America at a faster rate than it
would have otherwise. In the long run, all groups gained from the market integration,
but some groups gained more than others. In the short-to-medium run, some groups may
have lost because of competition from other countries’ imports. The pace of develop-
ment, in turn, has influenced nutritional levels, economic structure and urbanization,
levels of literacy, opportunities for women, and other social and economic conditions that
 Data for  to  are based on Japan’s household registration system. See Taeuber




influence fertility, mortality, and migration.
Globalization can also have a potent direct influence on population. Perhaps most
obvious is the influence on migration of policies toward the international flow of
refugees, workers, and their families. The forces of globalization have also directly
influenced fertility and mortality. In some instances globalization has been an important
positive force, particularly with respect to the globalization of health care. The most
notable example of a negative impact is probably the effect of globalization on the spread
of disease.
It is beyond our grasp to offer definitive evidence or firm conclusions about the
importance of globalization on the important demographic processes described above.
Our effort here will be more suggestive in that we hope to identify potentially important
ways in which globalization has influenced population.
Divergence in the Demographic Transition
We hypothesize that market integration was an important factor driving the demo-
graphic transition in Europe and North America in the nineteenth century. Increases in
life expectancy, in particular, were driven by more rapid development and by the
international diffusion and implementation of public health knowledge, nutritional prac-
tices, vaccines, and birth control practices [Fogel ]. The speed of diffusion increased
with globalization, as transportation and communication costs declined throughout its
first period (), with the telegraph in wide use and, later, telephone networks
rapidly expanding. Globalization also led to higher incomes in most countries, thereby
allowing new and old practices to be implemented more broadly and deeply. Record
population growth rates in Europe and North America were the result.
Why were the enormous gains in life expectancy achieved in the West and, to some
extent, in Japan not shared by the rest of the world? Three factors seem to be important,
all of which are related either directly or indirectly to the globalization processes that
existed at the time. First, living standards improved much more rapidly in Japan and in
the West than in the rest of the world. Maddison [: ] estimates that per capita
income grew four times as fast in Japan and the West as in other countries between 
and . Second, new public health developments and new knowledge about the causes,
prevention, and treatment of disease did not diffuse quickly and without cost throughout
the world. Third, globalization directly raised death rates in many countries by exposing
populations to pathogens for which they had developed no immunities. Europe itself
experienced devastating contact with the plague. But other populations in Latin Amer-
ica and the Pacific suffered enormously from their contacts with the West. Japan, on the
other hand, enjoyed a higher life expectancy than other Asian countries in part because
of its isolation. As compared with China, Japan experienced less devastation from war or
disease introduced by outside forces [ibid.].
During the interwar period, globalization and de-globalization trends pulled in
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opposite directions, accelerating the demographic transition in the West. On the one
hand, the disintegration of international capital, labor, and product markets reduced or
slowed national incomes significantly during the s and thereby reduced the demand
for children and consequently lowering birth rates. On the other hand, continuing
advances in communication technology and networks facilitated the rapid diffusion of
the new and old stock of public health information and technologies, thereby increasing
life expectancy. Sweden provides a good example of a country in which incomes fell in
the first half of the s, communication networks expanded during the interwar period,
and World War II generated few wartime casualties. Swedish life expectancy continued
its secular rise throughout the  period, while the downward trend in Swedish
birth rates accelerated in the low-growth interwar period, only to stage a momentary
recovery when Sweden mounted a vigorous economic recovery in the late s [ibid.: ].
Demographic Convergence
The re-emergence of globalization after the end of World War II was accompanied by
convergence in birth and death rates. What is the connection, if any, between the two
events? Some countries, particularly in East Asia, achieved extraordinarily rapid eco-
nomic growth and rapid demographic change. Japan and Singapore now rank number
one and two in the world in life expectancy. South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Hong Kong,
and Singapore all have fertility rates lower than in the United States. The evidence is
quite clear that these Asian countries owe a large part of their development to their
success at integrating themselves into the global economy and that their rapid economic
growth accelerated their demographic transitions.
A more widespread phenomenon, however, is the delinking of demography and
development. Relatively poor countries have now achieved relatively high life ex-
pectancies and low or moderate birth rates. The demographic gap between the rich and
the poor has declined much more rapidly than the economic gap.
What accounts for this phenomenon? We believe that an important cause is the
successful globalization of the health sector. Communication costs have become so small
that many people in even the most isolated areas are exposed to new ideas that allow
them to achieve better health and to regulate their childbearing. The reduction in
transportation costs have also facilitated efforts to increase the supplies of drugs and
other medical commodities to populations that were previously isolated.
Complementing these changes, and possibly more important, has been the develop-
ment of global institutions committed to improving health and reproductive health care
throughout the world. Prior to , the effort to improve health in the developing world
was the province of underfunded missionaries, a few private foundations, and the nascent
efforts of the League of Nations. Large-scale efforts by national, multinational, and
private nonprofit organizations became an important force only after World War II.
Foreign aid from the United States under the aegis of the Marshall Plan sped the recovery
  
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of Europe and, to a lesser extent, of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Development
assistance from Japan, Western Europe, and the United States to poor countries peaked
in the s and has declined as a percentage of GDP in the United States over the last 
years and in Japan in the last  years. Aid from donor countries has been particularly
important for some developing countries. For example, donor aid funded roughly 
percent of the health-care expenditures of sub-Saharan Africa countries (not including
South Africa) in .
Aid efforts by international organizations have complemented national bilateral
programs. The World Health Organization played an important role in introducing
environmental sanitation measures; providing essential drugs; vaccinating children in
the developing world against such infectious diseases as tetanus, diphtheria, measles,
tuberculosis, polio, and whooping cough; and eradicating such diseases as smallpox. The
World Bank, the United Nations Children’s Fund, Project Hope, Oxfam, and the United
Nations Development Programme have all played significant roles in upgrading health
care in developing countries and spreading the revolution in death and birth rates to poor
and middle-income countries. Relief organizations including the U. S. Agency for Inter-
national Development, CARE International, the International Red Cross, Medecins Sans
Frontieres, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Food Programme, and the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees have all been instrumental in reducing mortality
from disasters and wars.
The PostWorld War II Baby Boom
Completion of the demographic transition in the West was interrupted by the postWorld
War II baby boom. In Europe, North America, and Oceania, birth rates rose to levels more
than sufficient to replace lost wartime fertility. Japan experienced a substantial, but
short-lived, increase in birth rates in the early s. Economists disagree about why the
baby boom occurred, and the role that globalization processes played depends very much
on which theory is accepted.
The Chicago school emphasizes the competing effects of income on the ability to
afford children and the value of women’s time on the affordability of children [Becker
; Becker and Lewis ; Willis 	]. Butz and Ward [] argue that fertility
increased after the war because rising income led to an increased demand for children.
Although the wages of women and, hence, the opportunity costs of childbearing were
also rising, the effects were muted because many women were not part of the labor force.
Rising wages did draw women into the labor force during the s and early s.
Thus, increased female labor force participation and rising wages combined to increase
the “price” of children and led to declining fertility in the mid-s in the United States.
If this explanation of the baby boom is correct, re-globalization played only an
indirect role by stimulating simultaneous economic recovery from the global war throu-
ghout the West. Aid provided to Europe by the United States under the aegis of the
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Marshall Plan was a critical factor in Europe’s fast recovery and could be identified as a
global force inducing higher birth rates in Europe. Similar global forces, however, were
not present in the United States and could not have caused the U. S. baby boom.
Easterlin [] offers an alternative view in which globalization forces played a
much more direct role. (See also Easterlin, Wachter, and Wachter [].) Prior to ,
fluctuations in the U. S. economy produced fluctuations in immigration rates. The entry
of workers ebbed and flowed depending on domestic economic conditions. When the
United States and other countries closed their borders to immigrants after World War I,
economic fluctuations produced a fertility swing rather than an immigration swing.
Thus fertility declined to low levels during the Depression. Economic recovery after
World War II increased the demand for workers at the same time that an unusually small
cohortthose born during the Depressionwas entering the work force. This led to a
rapid increase in wages and rising fertility. Two forces led to the subsequent baby bust.
The first was the endogenous cycle generated by successive generations of large and
small cohorts. Baby boomers began to enter the labor force in record numbers, depress-
ing wages and their own fertility. The second was that, with re-globalization after World
War II, immigration became an important attenuating force so that economic cycles were
once again absorbed by immigration as well as by fertility.
Twenty-First Century Mortality Disasters
The mortality revolution has been disrupted in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia by the
spread of HIV, the human immunodeficiency virus that causes AIDS (acquired im-
munodeficiency syndrome) and in Russia by the collapse of life expectancy. Both
phenomena may be due to failed globalization. In sub-Saharan Africa, HIV has been
spread by the regionalization of labor markets, refugees fleeing civil wars, and rural
residents escaping drought by migrating to cities. Traditional social norms giving men
greater power than women in determining sexual practices have combined with migra-
tory labor patterns to produce a situation particularly conducive to spreading HIV
[Kauffman and Volks ]. Public health systems in sub-Saharan countries have
generally failed to communicate information to citizens or to persuade them of its
validity. This situation stands in stark contrast to that in Thailand, where campaigns by
public health authorities have been successful in markedly reducing infection rates since
the mid-s.
The decline in life expectancy in Russia stems from increasing rates of alcohol
consumption, rising suicide rates, declining levels of medical care, and increasing public
health hazards. Most explanations of this deterioration in mortality rates trace back to
Russia’s decline as a superpower and, more importantly, to its sharp decline in living
standards. The fall in Russia’s income could be attributed to its de-globalization
manifested in falling international tradeafter the dismantling of the communist bloc in




V The Impact of Population on Globalization
Historically, population growth has served as an impetus for exploration and coloniza-
tion. This is true to some extent in the case of European colonization of the Americas and
Oceania, where colonization involved substantial emigration. In both cases, colonization
may have served as an outlet from Malthusian pressures in Europe. The same cannot,
however, be said of European conquests in Asia and Africa, because they did not lead to
substantial emigration. We hypothesize that there are two ways in which population
factors may have influenced colonization. First, in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries European population growth led to increased shortages in agricultural land and
provided the impetus for migration to and exploitation of the land-rich, labor-poor
Americas, which had undergone depopulation through contact with Europeans. Second,
larger populationsand economiesgave European countries the power and wealth
needed to mount expeditions and to secure military conquests. How population influ-
ences war and security remains a controversial topic, however, about which no strong
consensus has emerged [Angell ; Simon ; Cashman : Ch.  ].
In recent years, population has influenced globalization via two channels: by in-
fluencing relative factor endowments and by influencing the national distribution of
global income [Helpman and Krugman ]. Our analysis emphasizes the first channel
and pays particular attention to how this channel has led to the rapid development of
East Asian countries over the last  years [Mason ].
Trade, foreign investment, and immigration are influenced by a variety of forces,
with one of the most important being differences in factor endowmentsof labor,
physical capital, and human capital. Countries with a limited supply of one of these
important economic resources gain by “cooperating” with countries with an abundant
supply of the same resource. The cooperation can take several forms. The factors
themselves can be exchanged, with the labor-abundant economy exchanging labor for
capital. Or the countries can specialize in the production of final goods and services and
engage in trade. Thus the economies with abundant labor produce labor-intensive goods,
and the economies with abundant capital produce capital-intensive goods. Through this
specialization, production costs can be minimized and higher standards of living attained.
Important intercountry differences exist in factor endowments, and sometimes rapid
changes occur. For example, capital per worker was much greater in the United States in
 than in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, or Thailand. But between  and the early
s, high rates of investment in those countries allowed them to greatly reduce the gap
and, in the case of Japan, eliminate it altogether (Fig.  ).
There is a striking relationship between demographic variables and factor endow-
ments. Countries with early and fast demographic transitions are relatively well en-
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dowed in physical and human capital, whereas countries with late demographic transi-
tions are relatively well endowed in labor. Consequently, countries that are at an early
stage in their demographic transition tend to be labor exporters, capital importers, and
producers of labor-intensive goods and services. Countries at a late stage in their
demographic transition tend to be labor importers, capital exporters, and producers of
capital and skill-intensive goods and services. Hong Kong and Singapore, among the first
Asian countries to achieve low fertility, are major labor importers, while leading labor
exporters are the Philippines and Bangladesh, two countries with delayed demographic
transitions.
The relationship is not just a statistical one, however. Population change has a
fundamental bearing on factor endowments and the substantial differences between the
wealthiest and the poorest countries in the world. The importance of population to
relative endowments of physical capital and labor follows from the tautological relation-
ship between capital per worker, investment, and labor force growth. Either a rise in the
rate of investment or a decline in the rate of labor force growth produces an increase in
capital per worker, known as capital deepening.) The importance of changes in labor
force growth is shown empirically in Fig. . Countries with the slowest rates of popula-
tion growth have the highest rates of capital deepening, whereas countries with the
highest rates of labor force growth have the lowest rates of capital deepening. Conse-
 This is a well-known implication of the Solow-Swan neoclassical model. In the simplest
case, consisting of no technological progress and Cobb-Douglas production technology, the
equilibrium capital-labor ratio is equal to K/L(s/n)1/(1b) where s is the investment rate (or
saving rate in a closed economy) and n is the rate of growth of the labor force.
Fig.  Capital-Labor Ratio: Selected Asian Countries, 
Source: Summers et al. n. d.





quently, those countries that first completed the transition from high to low rates of labor
force growth and first completed their demographic transition are relatively well en-
dowed in capital.)
Although the correlation between labor force growth and capital deepening is
unmistakable in Fig. , there is substantial variation around the regression line. Particu-
larly noteworthy are the unusually high rates of capital deepening achieved in several
East Asian countriesJapan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. What accounts for the
discrepancy? The answer is changes in investment rates.
The rise of investment and the resulting increase in capital per worker is one of the
most important and distinctive features of the successful economies of East and South-
east Asia. Fig.  compares investment rates in  with those in  for the countries
of the world for which such data are available. For the most part, countries with low
rates of investment in  had low rates of investment in . Countries with a high
rate of investment in  actually experienced some deterioration over the ensuing three
decades. But the successful economies of East Asia are notable exceptions to the general
pattern. Most of the Asian “miracle” economies had relatively low rates of investment in
, but much higher rates of investment in . Japan was distinctive in that it
managed to achieve a high rate of investment in  and an even higher rate in 
(Fig.  ). It was this increase in investment rates among the countries of East Asia that
 If countries maintained a constant labor force growth rate for a sustained period of time,
then the capital-labor ratio would stabilize. But in recent years countries with low labor
force growth rates have generally experienced declining labor force growth rates, and
countries with high labor force growth rates have experienced rising labor force growth
rates.
Fig.  Capital Deepening and the Rate of Labor Force Growth
Source: Mason : 
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accounts for their rapid capital deepening.
Recent studies have established important connections between the demographic
transition and both labor force growth rates and rates of saving and investment. In some
simple economic models, population growth rates and labor force growth rates are not
even distinguished. Indeed, there is a close connection between the two. But during the
demographic transition the labor force growth rate can deviate substantially from the
population growth rate. This phenomenon, often referred to as the demographic bonus
or dividend, occurs for two reasons. First, the working-age population may grow
substantially more rapidly than the total population and, second, female labor force
participation may increase substantially as fertility rates decline. Both phenomena have
been prominent in Asian countries that have proceeded the most rapidly through their
demographic transitions [Bloom and Williamson ; Mason ].
The systematic differences between population growth and labor force growth
are apparent in Fig. , which is based on all countries for which data are available for
the  period. At very high rates of population growth, the growth rate of
the working-age population was somewhat slower than that of the total population. As
a result, for example, Africa’s labor force grew more slowly than its populationa
demographic penalty. As population growth declines from high levels, however, the
working-age population grows more rapidly than the total population. For the entire
-year period, , labor force growth exceeded population growth by nearly 	
percent for countries with an intermediate rate of population growth (about 	 percent
per annum).
In some countries the gap between labor force growth and population growth has
Fig.  Investment Rates of 
 Countries,  versus 






been especially large. Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan are three notable examples.
Their labor force growth rates were so rapid because they experienced very large swings
in their age structures and large increases in female labor force participation rates. Even
though their population growth rates declined rapidly, their labor force growth rates did
not. As these countries continue through the demographic transition they will begin to
experience much slower labor force growth. This will serve as an additional impetus to
capital deepening. However, between  and  it was rising investment rates, not
slowing labor force growth, that was responsible for capital deepening in those countries
[Mason ].
The changes in investment rates presented in Fig.  reflect changes in domestic
saving rates and international capital flows. Recent research provides persuasive evi-
dence that changes in age structure and increases in life expectancy have had an
important effect on domestic saving rates, although the strength of the effect is a matter
of continuing debate. Studies by Kelley and Schmidt [], Toh [], and Williamson
and Higgins [] conclude that declines in the dependency ratio have had a large
positive effect on gross national saving rates. Deaton and Paxson [] find that changes
in age structure had a more modest effect on household saving, but one that is nonethe-
less economically important. Simulation studies by Lee, Mason, and Miller [; ]
conclude that increases in life expectancy and declining dependency ratios were both
important factors in the rise in domestic saving rates but that demographic change was
only partly responsible for the large increases in saving observed in East Asia.
The bottom line: to a significant degree the demographic transition has driven the
changes in factor endowments. Countries with rapid population growth and high
dependency ratios have, as a consequence, been relatively well endowed in labor and
relatively poorly endowed in capital. Countries that completed their demographic
Fig.  Labor Force Growth and Population Growth:  Countries,

Source: Mason : 
Note: Diagonals represent growth rates of the support ratio.
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transitions earlier are, as a consequence, relatively well endowed in capital rather than
labor. A smaller group of countries, primarily found in East and Southeast Asia, have
made the transition to low birth and death ratesdemographics that favor high capital-
labor ratios and have experienced rapid capital deepening.
The connections between demographics and factor endowments are all the more
important in light of the major divergence in age structure between the countries of
the West and most of the rest of world during the demographic transition. As discussed
above, dependency ratios, life expectancies, and population growth rates differed
much less during the nineteenth century than they did during the twentieth century.
The divergence in age structure, population growth rates, and life expectancy was
responsible to a significant degree for divergent factor endowments and increased
incentives for international trade, immigration, and capital flows. The effects of the
demographic transition are far from complete. In the coming years, rapid aging and, in
some instances, depopulation in Japan, Europe, and to a lesser extent the United States
will provide a new impetus for trade, immigration, and foreign investment. The impor-
tant connection between population and globalization will continue for the foreseeable
future.)
Our discussion emphasizes the connection between factor endowments and globali-
zation because of its historical and continuing importance to the relationship between the
industrialized and the developing economies of the world. Other forces are also driving
globalization, and, as just mentioned, we believe that they will become more important
over time.
Most global trade is already between high-income countries with similar factor
endowments, not between low- and high-income countries. Modern trade theory offers a
variety of explanations for this phenomenon, but emphasizes the importance of special-
ization and scale economies in the production of goods and services [Helpman and
Krugman ]. During the last few decades the U. S. share of global manufacturing
production has declined in favor of Japan, Europe, South Korea, and other countries. As
a consequence, trade within member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development (OECD) has increased substantially.
Population growth plays a role in this phenomenon because differential rates of
growth in the population (or labor force) will lead to further changes in the regional
distribution of production and manufactured production. As noted in section III, the
global distribution of population is shifting away from the West toward the rest of the
world, especially Africa and Asia. Other things being equal, growth of the working-age
population in non-OECD countries should lead to a rise in their share of global manufac-
 The empirical literature on this issue is not well developed, but one recent study
[Williamson and Higgins ] concludes that age structure is having an important effect
on international capital flows.
  		
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turing production. This in turn should lead to a rise in OECD imports from non-OECD
countries and to a decline in trade within OECD (as a fraction of OECD production).
It is unclear whether the shift in the global distribution of manufacturing will
produce a substantial increase in global trade or merely influence the trade patterns by
shifting trade from within OECD to between OECD and non-OECD countries. Bergoeing
and Kehoe [] argue that changes in the regional distribution of production cannot
account for the rapid rise in global trade in recent years.
VI Conclusion
The global demographic transition is still incomplete. African nations and some Asian
nations are still in early stages of the transition. As their transitions proceed, the
potential for changes in trade patterns, capital flows, and immigration looms large. At
the same time, the revolution in life expectancy is likely to continue in the developed
world unless it is disrupted by widespread use of weapons of mass destruction or the
emergence and spread of new infectious diseases. Whether the mortality revolution
continues in the developing world is likely to depend upon whether developing countries
are able to put institutions in place that facilitate the transmission and acceptance of
public health knowledge and new medical practices.
The adoption of social institutions that facilitate information transmission and allow
adaptation to changing circumstances is surely the critical element for any society, as
efficient institutions will also generate strong economic growth. Globalization and
demography are likely to generate a virtuous circle of benefits only when attention is
paid to the underlying institutions through which they are filtered. Without well-
functioning political and economic institutions, globalization can be dysfunctional for
any society. Filtered through a system of incentives that does not reflect social costs or
benefits, globalization and demography can interact to produce large populations living
in poverty. In sum, the critical task for any society is to get the institutions right.
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